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Note: This case should be considered historical fiction, based partly on historical facts, but couched in a fictional managerial setting (Jane 
Young is fictional).  Additionally, this case was written in October 2020 with the full understanding that future months may make much of the 
content of this case irrelevant or very important to the pandemic response.  We invite readers to go back in time and consider the case’s 
dilemmas without your personal knowledge of what happens in the future – the case writer did not have the privilege of knowing the future as 
you now do.  This case does not proport to accurately capture the managerial decisions, options, or issues of BRHD during October 2020.  It 
was written primarily to use to teach the application of managerial decision principles and tools.  However, we made efforts to be truthful 
about statistics and data.  In addition, the application and principles of contact tracing are accurately described as dictated by the CDC. 
 
HSB Teaching Series content is developed solely for the basis for class discussion. Content is not intended to serve as endorsements, sources of 
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BEAR RIVER HEALTH DEPARTMENT: COVID-19 CONTACT TRACING 




As the director of the Bear River Health Department (BRHD), Jane Young started her position in 
the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic response as her predecessor announced that his 
expected retirement would commence slightly earlier than anticipated. One of the most pressing 
tasks that Jane faced was managing BRHD’s COVID-19 contact tracing unit. Identified as an 
instrumental component of controlling the spread of the disease, the contact tracing unit was 
tasked with communicating with individuals in the community that recently tested positive for the 
viral infection, providing isolation instructions and support to infected individuals, asking about 
their close contacts that could have possibly been infected, and then following up with those 
contacts providing instruction about testing and self-quarantine.  The work itself was taxing and 
required team members to be able to quickly build rapport by conveying trust and empathy over 
the phone during a time when community members’ trust of public officials was at an all-time 
low.  
 
Contact tracing was further hampered by an unpredictable work load.  Epidemiology models 
could predict the spread of the disease in aggregate given different scenarios, but the work of 
the health department was often interrupted by outbreaks, hot-spots, potential super-spreading 
events, and a public that didn’t always respond to government attempts to keep community 
members safe.  Workload was further exacerbated by the variation in number of contacts each 
individual might have been in contact with during the two to three days prior to their positive test 
result.  In some cases, newly infected individuals were highly active in the community and 
provided multiple names or entire groups of people that could have been potentially infected.  In 
these cases, follow-up contacting could take hours.  However, in other cases individuals were 











either already very isolated or were unwilling or unable to provide many contacts outside their 
immediate household.   
 
As an experienced public health administrator, Jane knew the importance of proper and timely 
contact tracing, but the work seemed to keep flooding in and the team didn’t seem able to keep 
up.  She knew that the further behind the team got in being able to respond quickly to their 
tracing efforts, the more cases would develop in the communities she was sworn to keep 
healthy –improving the contact tracing efforts of the department were literally a matter of life and 
death to the vulnerable in her community. Taking this job in the midst of a pandemic was hard 
enough, but she needed to quickly gain expertise in understanding how to manage the workload 
of the contact tracing unit.  
COVID-19 Spread 
 
First identified in 2019 and declared a world-wide pandemic in March 2020, COVID-191 was a 
disease outbreak caused by a new strain of coronavirus SARS-CoV-19 originated in bats.  By 
October 2020, over 44 million people had been infected worldwide resulting in a projected 1.17 
million deaths2. The virus spread quickly throughout the world with varying degrees of success 
in isolating and controlling its spread. Most infected people had virus in their mouths, noses, and 
throats that were exhaled out on droplets when talking, sneezing, coughing, laughing, singing, 
and even just breathing. Virus transmission mainly occurred in two ways: (1) Droplets exhaled 
by infected individuals could enter into another person’s mouth, eyes, nose, or throat – this type 
of transmission was more likely when people were in close proximity to one another.  And (2) a 
transmission could occur if a person who had touched an infected surface (something that an 
infected droplet had landed on) later touched their own mouth, nose, or eyes. 
  
While this type of viral transmission was typical of seasonal flu, the SARS-CoV-19 virus did not 
cause symptoms to all infected people (referred to as asymptomatic infections).  However, 
nearly all infected individuals could still unknowingly spread the virus.  For those that did have 
symptoms, the virus had a relatively long incubation period before symptoms appeared, 2 to 14 
days with an average of 5 days.  An infected person could spread the virus two days prior to the 
first day they experienced symptoms.  Asymptomatic and pre-symptomatic spread made the 
virus particularly hard to control.     
 
 
1 COVID-19 is a disease caused by a new strain of coronavirus. 'CO' stands for corona, 'VI' for virus, and 'D' for disease. Formerly, this 
disease was referred to as '2019 novel coronavirus' or ‘2019-nCoV.'  https://www.who.int/  
 
2 Accessed October 28, 2020  https://g.co/kgs/FAKsrh 









CARES Act and Public Health 
 
The US federal response was to push financial support to individual state, local, and tribal 
governments by providing funding through the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security 
(CARES) Act.  CARES created the largest economic stimulus ever attempted by the US federal 
government; as part of the overall $2 trillion stimulus, Congress allocated $139 billion to states 
to assist in expenditures related to public health response including covering “payroll expenses 
for public safety, public health, health care, human services, and similar employees whose 
services are substantially dedicated to mitigating or responding to the COVID-19 public health 
emergency3” including specific permission for expenses to go toward contact tracing employees.  
This funding allowed health departments to work with local healthcare providers to quickly set 
up testing centers, identify treatment locations, and understand ICU capacity to treat severely ill 
patients. In addition, it ushered in a wave of job posting for contact tracers and disease 
investigators across the country. 
 
By 2020 there were roughly 2,800 health departments across the US4 acting as government 
agencies that worked to promote and ensure community health, environmental health, public 
health infrastructure, and preparedness. The COVID-19 pandemic and the CARES act funding 
launched general awareness of public health and the role of local health departments as they 
spearheaded testing, education, public safety, and attempts to contain the spread of the virus 
across the country. 
  
Health departments were allocated funds proportionate to their population size; the state of Utah 
was allocated $1.25 billion dollars and interim reports showed the state had spent $235 million 
dollars by June 20205.  
Bear River Health Department 
 
The Bear River Health Department (BRHD) is one of 13 health departments in Utah. The BRHD 
has jurisdiction over Cache, Rich, and Box Elder Counties, the three most northern counties in 
the state, largely rural with a combined population of around 185,000 covering nearly 9,000 
square miles.  The area included the college town of Logan, home to Utah State University 
(USU) with nearly 20,000 students living near or on campus in years prior to the pandemic.  In 





4 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Local_health_departments_in_the_United_States  Accessed Oct 2020 
 
5 https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/Interim-Report-of-Costs-Incurred-by-State-and-Local-Recipients-through-June-30.pdf 




















Controlling the Spread 
 
The primary public health response was to promote and encourage people to change the types 
of behaviors that would lead to more rapid transmission of the virus. Since asymptomatic and 
pre-symptomatic spread was prevalent, the best way to avoid transmission was to avoid social 
contact - anyone could unknowingly be infected and contagious. World-wide physical distancing 
practices began in March of 2020; public health officials encouraged employers to allow people 
to work from home; delivery and remote pick up of retail grocery and pharmacy orders were 
ramped up; schools transitioned to online delivery modes; and non-essential businesses were 
asked to close.  Social isolation practices were effective in limiting the spread, but they quickly 
introduced economic and mental health burdens that only the most autocratically controlled and 
socially minded citizenry could maintain.  
   









Public health officials instead encouraged their citizens to avoid large crowds, stay socially 
distanced from others (at least six feet), wear face coverings, and wash their hand regularly.  By 
Fall 2020 the school districts of BRHD had reopened as had most businesses, religious 
congregations, and other organizations. Face coverings were required at schools and most 
retail businesses; Utah State University reduced maximum classroom capacity to accommodate 
social distance standards.  Cleaning and sanitizing surfaces such as door knobs, handles, 
desks and any other regularly touched surfaces became a regular practice.  
 
 




To determine if an individual had COVID-19, a polymerase chain reaction (PCR) test was 
conducted, usually by taking a sample of the droplets inside a person’s nose using a swab.  A 
positive test would indicate that the virus’s specific RNA was replicating and that there was an 
active infection – a false positive was rare.  However, a false negative could occur especially if 
tests were to occur early in incubation stages so that the small amount of viral RNA could not be 
detected. Test results could take as long as three days to be returned, although by October 
2020 most test results of symptomatic patients were returned within 24 hours.   
 
By Fall 2020 testing centers were available in nearly all local communities including a dedicated 
testing center for USU students and staff.  While testing centers were busy, long lines that had 
been experienced earlier in the year were no longer a problem.  Still, by October 2020 cases 
were surging nationally and locally. 
 












Figure 4: Drawing of COVID-19 Testing 
Source: https://coronavirus-download.utah.gov/business/COVID-19_Business_Packet_FIN.pdf 
Contact Tracing Background 
 
Well before the onset of COVID-19, contact tracing had been used as an effective public health 
management response to control and stop the spread of infectious disease.  Most notably, an 
outbreak of the Ebola virus in West Africa was contained in 20146.  The basic principles of 
contact tracing are to (1) isolate known cases of a disease and (2) to identify and quarantine 
potentially exposed people, that is, people who are known to have been in contact with infected, 
contagious people.   
 
The level of contagion of infectious diseases vary and is measured by the average number of 
people an infected case will, in turn, infect.  This is known as an R0 value (pronounced R 
naught).  An R0 of 2 means each infected person will, on average, infect 2 others. Measles is 
often cited as having an R0 between 12 to 18 making it one of the most contagious diseases 7. 
An R0 less than 1 means the disease is in decline and will eventually die out; an R0 that equals 
1 means the disease will stay alive but won’t cause an outbreak or epidemic.  COVID-19 has a 
reported R0 value as low as 2 to 3 and as high as 5.7 8; regardless, at these R0 levels the 
number of cases would double every 3 to 6 days if left unchecked.  
  
Testing and contact tracing responses aim to reduce spread of the disease by removing 
contagious individuals from the community to reduce the number of subsequent infections they 
can cause.  Contact tracing efforts have been proven successful but are only achievable if 
responses are timely and citizens are understanding and accommodating.      
 
 
6 Saurabh, S., & Prateek, S. (2017). Role of contact tracing in containing the 2014 Ebola outbreak: a review. African health sciences, 17(1), 
225–236. https://doi.org/10.4314/ahs.v17i1.28 
 
7 Guerra FM, Bolotin S, Lim G, et al. The basic reproduction number (R0) of measles: a systematic review. The Lancet. Infectious Diseases. 
2017 Dec;17(12):e420-e428. DOI: 10.1016/s1473-3099(17)30307-9. 
 
8 Sanche, S., Lin, Y., Xu, C., Romero-Severson, E., Hengartner, N., & Ke, R. (2020). High Contagiousness and Rapid Spread of Severe 
Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2. Emerging Infectious Diseases, 26(7), 1470-1477. https://dx.doi.org/10.3201/eid2607.200282. 











Figure 5:Graph of Reproductive Number (R0 or R-Naught) 
 
 
Figure 6: Small Reproductive Numbers Create Large Outbreaks 
 
 
Figure 7: Impact of Preventing Just One Infection 
 
Source: Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health Coursera Course on Contact Tracing: 
https://www.coursera.org/learn/covid-19-contact-tracing 
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 license. 











Contact Tracing Process 
 
Upon receiving a positive test result in their community, a member of the tracing team begins to 
investigate a case9 by calling the infected individual. Usually the person has already been 
contacted by testing staff or their doctor who has told them the results of the test and asked 
them to expect to be contacted by a member of the health department contact tracing unit. 
Cases are often very emotional upon hearing about their positive test results; they can be 
anxious about their health or of the health of their close family or friends that may be at higher 
risk; they may be frustrated with the inconvenience the infection will bring; or, they may have 
feelings of embarrassment about having been infected or the possibility of having infected 
others. For this reason, contact tracers are trained in empathetic responses and active listening 
techniques in order to build rapport with their cases.  Contact tracers don’t provide medical 
advice since they are usually not trained in doing so.    
 
 
Figure 8:Six Steps to Investigate Cases and Trace Their Contacts 
Source: Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health Coursera Course on Contact Tracing: 
https://www.coursera.org/learn/covid-19-contact-tracing   
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 license. 
 
After introducing themselves and the purpose of their call, the contact tracer asks the case 
about the nature of the symptoms they are currently feeling in order to assess if they need 
immediate medical attention – chest pain, trouble breathing, and blue lips are signs that the 
virus is causing severe lung damage, in which case the tracer helps the case to seek immediate 
emergency care. In most cases emergency care is not warranted, so the contact tracer next 
calculates the period of time that the case would likely have been infectious by asking when the 
case first felt symptoms.  The infectious period usually starts two days prior to the first sign of 
symptoms (or 2 days prior to the first positive test for asymptomatic cases) and will last through 
 
9 People who have been confirmed as infected are referred to as cases.  People who have been in close contact with cases are called 
contacts. 









the duration of their illness, usually 10 days from when symptoms appear. The timing of when a 
person is tested and how long it takes for test results to return can vary, so contact tracers often 




Figure 9: Timeline of Infection: Infections Period 
 
 
Figure 10: Timeline of Infection: Window of Opportunity 
 
Source: Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health Coursera Course on Contact Tracing: 
https://www.coursera.org/learn/covid-19-contact-tracing   
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 license. 
  
Next, the case is asked to list individuals with whom they may have been in close contact during 
their infectious period.  Close contact is defined as having been within 6 feet of an individual for 
more than 15 minutes.  Tracers talk to cases about their days, asking them where they went 











and who they talked to in order to compile a list of contacts10.  At times, cases are hesitant to 
share information for fear of breach of privacy or because they are embarrassed about the 
situation. Tracers let cases know that personal and medical information will be kept private and 
that tracers are bound by HIPPA laws11 to keep information private; contacts will only be told 
that they have been in close contact with someone who was infected and tracers will not divulge 
the case’s name.  Similarly, they describe that the purpose of tracing is not for data gathering 
but for disease control; the information that cases provide is only used in stopping the spread of 
the disease.  
  
Next, tracers ask the case to isolate until after their infectious period is over (10 days from the 
start of symptoms and 24 hours without fever and without medication).  This means they are to 
limit all close contact with another person for that time period. In many cases, living 
arrangements make this infeasible, for example a case may share living space with others and 
has no feasible alternative living situations. Some communities have established isolation living 
arrangements e.g., Utah State University has designated some dorms as isolation and 
quarantine living quarters. Tracers ask cases if they will have access to food, medicine, and 
other necessities during their period of isolation.  If cases are hesitant to isolate due to 
economic hardship, family, work, or school responsibilities the tracer tries to identify the needs 
and the concerns of the case and refer them to community and social support services. 
 
After the call with the case, the tracer begins calling the contacts and explains to them that they 
have been identified as having had close contact with an infectious and contagious individual.  
They are asked to self-quarantine for 14 days from the day of the contact and given similar 
instructions and resources given to cases (note: infected cases isolate, contacts quarantine).  If 
they are feeling symptoms, they are asked to get tested to confirm if they have become infected; 
if their results come back positive, they become a case and their contacts are collected and 
asked to quarantine. If they are not feeling symptoms but there has a been sufficient number of 
days since contact with the case, they may seek out testing as well.  However, a negative test of 
a contact may mean that the virus has not had time to fully incubate in order to be detected by a 
test – incubation period is up to 14 days, but on average is 5 days, so a negative test result is 
not a substitute for a full quarantine period.        
 
10 People who have been in close contact with cases are called contacts. People who have been confirmed as infected are referred to as 
cases.   
 
11 The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability (HIPPA) Act of 1996 ensures that protected health information (PHI) cannot be 
disclosed without permission.    















During the summer months of 2020 the 7-day average number of positive cases was close to 20 
a day in BRHD with a regular peak of around 30 cases a day early in the week to account for a 
lull in testing over the weekend.  Looking through the historical data, Jane noticed that cases 
spiked 5 to 14 days after holidays or celebrations due to isolated super-spreader events in 
which one infected individual had infected many others at a family picnic or other gathering.  In 
June, a meat packing plant in Cache County also had a major outbreak resulting in over 440 
cases and the death of an employee12.  During this outbreak, lines for testing centers in BRHD 
were often hours long as the public saw its first local outbreak coincide with the seasonal bloom 
of local flora that introduced pollen into the air, causing allergy sufferers to question their 
symptoms that were similar to those of COVID-19.  On June 5th, BRHD saw its highest positive 
case count to date with 218 positive cases reported in one day. 
   
By the end of August, the number of cases had dropped to an average of around 10 a day in 
BRHD, but the reopening of public schools and the return of university students to the area led 
to a steady increase of cases throughout the fall months.  By October, Utah Governor Herbert 
changed the alert status of health districts and nearly all counties, including those in BRHD, 
putting them on high alert13. By the end of October hospitals throughout the state were reporting 
that they had reached ICU bed capacity14 and the new 7-day average of BRHD was close to 85 





















By June of 2020, BRHD had hired and trained 7 contact tracers that could be deployed to work 
up to 40 hours a week.  On average, a case and all subsequent follow-up contacts took 30 
minutes to complete, but the time varied dramatically depending on the individual circumstances 
of the case.  Tracers were paid by the hour not by the case and were instructed to not go faster 
than necessary – making sure tracing efforts were done correctly was deemed more important 
than completing two cases an hour.  On the other hand, the department had a goal to complete 
tracing for all cases on the day they received the positive test result. 
 
 
Figure 12: Bear River Health Department - Daily Positive Test Count, March 2020 to Oct 2020 
Source: Utah Department of Health, https://coronavirus.utah.gov/case-counts/  retrieved Nov 1st, 2020 
   
Except for the week of the meat plant outbreak, the team was able to meet this goal throughout 
the summer months. However, by October many case and contact interviews were happening 
the day after the positive test; even with the entire team working full time, they rarely cleared out 
the incoming list of work to complete. The same-day goal was not just a good idea established 
by management; the faster contact tracing could be completed, the more likely a quarantine of a 
potentially infected individual would stop further transmission.  If a person had contact with a 
contagious individual more than 5 days before contact tracing started, it was likely that they 
were now actively contagious and spreading the disease themselves. Contact tracing had 





































































































































































Having started this position during a growing wave of infections, Jane saw the inability of the 
contact tracing team to meet the same-day goal as a serious problem.  Setting up a meeting 
with her leadership team, she asked each member of her team to come prepared with options 
and details or data that would help them make the right decisions.  After a grueling half-day 
Zoom meeting, she summarized to the team their options: 
 
1. Hire and train more contact tracers. 
 
The tracing team lead emphasized that the team was unable to keep up with the work on most 
days, and it seemed like they needed more tracers.  However, all trained and experienced 
contact tracers, for that matter anyone with a public health background, were already working 
given the worldwide pandemic. So, this option meant recruiting and training new tracers.  Other 
health departments around the country had found success in asking applicants to take an online 
six-hour training developed by Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health and offered 
free on Coursera15 before applying for the position.  The training was well-designed and 
introduced potential hires to the work they would do but was far from complete. New tracers 
would complete their training with the help of existing tracers thus temporarily reducing the 
team’s capacity.  The human resources director estimated that it would take two months to fully 
train a contact tracer to take on a load as heavy as that of current team members.   
 
2. Train their existing contact tracing staff to work faster. 
 
A quick calculation showed that the current capacity of the team should be 112 cases a day, so 
the team lead was challenged as to why the team was getting behind in the first place.  Even 
with the recent surge, the BRHD 7-day average daily count was around this number.  The team 
lead didn’t have an answer but insisted that the team was working as hard as it could – there 
were no slackers on the team and everyone was carrying a full load.  Someone suggested that 
the average time spent on each case must be more than 30 minutes.  Someone else was able 
to quickly pull some data and showed that the average number of cases completed per tracer 
per 8 hour shift was 14.5 for the past 30 days but was perhaps much higher in the past 7 days.  
The standard deviation was high – also roughly 14.5 cases per day per tracer per shift.  What 
would happen if the mean time was reduced to 30 minutes or lower?  Also, what would happen 
if the variance was somehow reduced?  What could be done to reduce the mean and variance 















3. Crosstrain other BRHD staff to be used during short term, predictable spikes in 
infections. 
 
BRHD consisted of 110 health professionals working in varying areas.  Since most had a public 
health background, training them to be contact tracers might be faster and easier.  However, 
contact tracers did a lot of their work during irregular hours – they usually did not work a normal 
9-to-5 business day, but worked as cases came and did a lot of following-up during evenings 
and weekends. Most BRHD employees did not work these types of hours.  Additionally, most 
employees didn’t have many extra hours in their workday to start contact tracing – it had been 
all-hands-on-deck since the outbreak, and everyone had work in their own domain that was 
already related to the pandemic.  Should contact tracing have priority over some of the other 
work done at BRHD?  Some of the staff were working on public relations efforts to try to get 
citizens to be aware of what they could do to be safer.  Others were working closely with 
hospitals and testing centers to monitor access to PPE and tracking the capacity of ICUs.  
Hospitals were beginning to ask for medically qualified personnel to take shifts in the hospitals 
to relieve their own burdened staff. The environmental staff was working closely with the local 
sewer and wastewater treatment plants to get another picture of the spread of the disease in the 
communities. Still others were pushing hard to promote flu shot clinics at schools throughout the 
region in order to offset the coming flu season.  The demand for other social services offered by 
the BRHD had also only increased due to economic hardships caused by the pandemic.    
 
4. Ask school districts and Utah State University to do the contact tracing for cases from 
students from their schools. 
 
Utah State University had already placed a job posting to hire contact tracers for cases 
originating from their students.  As a part of their response to the pandemic and their dedication 
to staying open, USU had become certified to conduct their own testing and had dedicated 
dorms for isolation and quarantine.  In October 2020, USU was recognized as a leader among 
universities for their preparation, response, policies and relative success in the face of the 
challenging times16.  By the end of October, USU was seeing about a 7-day average of between 
13 and 17 new cases a day with spikes around 25.  However, all in-person classes and 
activities were moving fully online after Thanksgiving and most students would not return to 















Figure 13: Utah State University's 7-day COVID-19 Case Trends 
Source: https://www.usu.edu/covid-19/  Retrieve November 1, 2020 
 
Other local health departments were asking for help from their K-12 school districts to perform 
tracing for student cases17.  This effort largely fell on the shoulders of districts’ nursing staff.  
This approach had varying success; some nurses were unable to find time to conduct the 
tracing.  In other areas, school districts were happy to take on tracing since they felt they could 
do a better job knowing where students had been inside a school, who they had close contact 
with, and what activities they had been a part of.  School district administrators were committed 
to staying open and could be convinced of the value of contact tracing as a part of their overall 
strategy.  It was also another way to show parents the commitment of the district and the 
seriousness placed on children’s safety during the pandemic.    
 
A member of the leadership team pointed out that the BRHD community update given on 
October 28, 2020 reported the following statistics: 
 
“It is also important to know that 57% of our transmission is due to household exposure, 
and 16% is from social gatherings. Workplace transmission represents about 9% and 
there is very little transmission occurring in our K-12 classrooms. Students, teachers, 
and administrators have been vigilant in classroom settings.18” 
 
 
17 e.g., Weber School District:  http://wsd.net/covid-19/adjusted-quarantine-guidelines/new-quarantine-guidelines 
 
18 Executive Director’s update accessed Nov 1, 2020:  https://brhd.org/coronavirus/ 
 











Looking closer at the data, only about 4% of the cases could be attributed to school classroom 
transmission.  Was it fair to push the tracing efforts to the schools if they were already doing 
such a good job trying to enforce behavior change among their students? 
 
Additionally, some members of Jane’s team pointed out that BRHD would not have as much 
control over tracing efforts conducted by other parties. They pointed to early days in the 
pandemic when the Governor had authorized the Utah National Guard to act as contact tracers 
and a few were assigned to BRHD. The quality of the guard members’ work was not at the level 
of the current team – they could only do half as many cases per day, and they were less able to 
build the rapport needed to properly get contact information from cases.  Would the same 
happen if the school districts handled contact tracing?   
 
5. Ask or force contact tracers to work overtime during spikes. 
 
One member of the leadership team suggested that maybe the tracers just got behind 
occasionally and that some overtime would take care of the issue. The team lead thought that 
morale of the team was already pretty low, they were working very hard, and the fruits of their 
labor were not evident as case counts continued to rise.  Forcing or even asking the team to 
work overtime might prove to be a breaking point. She had particular concern for a couple of 
members of the team who had experienced some rough days recently; what would happen if 
these two quit when they were needed the most?  
 
Additionally, no one could predict accurately when the current wave would recede – was this 
just a temporary spike or should the team be considering a more long-term solution?  After 
meeting with federal CDC officials, the Governor’s office told local health departments to expect 
the numbers of cases to continue to rise throughout the cold winter months19.  A “wave” is a 
good analogy since an ocean wave is proceeded by another and there is no on/off switch that 
will give the team a break – if the team works overtime there will likely be no time for rest and 
recovery. 
 
6. Divide the daily workload evenly between the contact tracers, and let them work on their 
own list of cases rather than working off of a master list. 
 
One team member suggested that the team was overwhelmed by the long list of cases that 













overwhelming and would give some sense of ownership to the tracers, motivating them to get 
the work completed on time.  Something didn’t seem quite right about this idea, but no one 




Monday, November 2nd 2020:  Jane knew she had to act now.  What the future would hold was 
uncertain, but she believed in being prepared and in taking actions needed to protect the health 
of her community, and her first test as the new director of BRHD was to maintain contact tracing 







Task of Health Departments  
from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Local_health_departments_in_the_United_States 
Accessed Oct 28, 2020 
 
1. Monitor health status to identify and solve community health problems. 
2. Diagnose and investigate health problems and health hazards in the community. 
3. Inform, educate, and empower people about health issues. 
4. Mobilize community partnerships and action to identify and solve health problems. 
5. Develop policies and plans that support individual and community health efforts. 
6. Enforce laws and regulations that protect health and ensure safety. 
7. Link people to needed personal health services and assure the provision of healthcare 
when otherwise unavailable. 
8. Assure competent public and personal healthcare workforce. 
9. Evaluate effectiveness, accessibility, and quality of personal and population-based 
health services. 
10. Research for new insights and innovative solutions to health problems. 
 
